Accounting Policy Selection Behavior for Retirement Benefit Accounting

By considering the actual state of accounting policy selection behavior by management, this book empirically clarifies the mechanism that leads to optimization of disclosure of corporate content.
Even if management can select the company's accounting policy at their discretion, how the accounting policy is selected  at an appropriate level, and the relationship between cause and the effect must be considered.

By considering the revision of the retirement benefit system by management, this book empirically clarifies the mechanism by which the introduction and revision of the retirement benefit accounting standard has given to management behavior.

When a manager makes a system revision for the purpose of manipulating accounting figures, they must consider what kind of company and at what timing the system revision will be carried out, and the causal relationship between the cause and effect.

Results are shown based on the actual state of disclosure of retirement benefit accounting, which reflects management's accounting policy selection behavior, and the research results of management behavior of the retirement benefit system revision.